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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, in a case decided on equitable principles, in 
setting forth the alimony award, the property division and the refusal to award 
Respondent any attorney's fees. "Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property division in divorce cases, and will be upheld 
unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. 
Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). The trial court does not abuse its 
discretion in considering the respective fault of the parties in apportioning such 
award. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(b). Where a party challenges the trial court's 
finding of fact, the appellate court first determines whether the appellant has 
marshaled all of the evidence supporting the court's findings and then 
demonstrates that the finding is against the clear weight of the evidence. Chen v. 
Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to award Respondent unpaid alimony when the 
trial court, as the fact finder, determined that the parties' mutual mistakes 
prompted Petitioner to make past-due payments on the mortgage in lieu of 
alimony when Respondent had been previously ordered to make those payments. 
Where a party challenges the trial court's finding of fact, the appellate court first 
determines whether the appellant has marshaled all of the evidence supporting the 
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court's findings and then demonstrates that the finding is against the clear weight 
of the evidence. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Respondent's brief correctly sets forth the appropriate constitutional and statutory 
provisions affecting the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
Respondent's statement adequately addresses the nature of her appeal without the 
need for additional comment. 
Course of Proceedings 
Respondent's statement here omits the fact that subsequent to a trial in this matter, 
that on or about June 12, 2004, the trial court held a telephonic hearing pursuant to 
Respondent's objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. At the 
close of that hearing the trial court made two changes to the proposed order but left the 
remaining findings intact. Thereafter, on or about July 22, 2004, Respondent filed her 
Motion to Amend Findings. Subsequent to a hearing on that motion, the court left the 
order intact but clarified its position that the award at issue was based on the principles of 
equity that manifested throughout the trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent's statement of the facts wholly omits any statement of fact leading the 
trial court to state that the Decree of Divorce was decided on equitable principles. See p 
of the Amended Findings attached to Respondent's Addenda as Exhibit N. As such, 
Respondent has wholly failed to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's findings. 
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This failure is fatal to the present appeal. Nowhere in the appeal does Respondent infomi 
the Court that the trial court heard evidence during the trial that established that 
Respondent abandoned Petitioner while he was traveling for his employment. That on 
his return he discovered that Respondent had emptied the bank accounts, taken one of 
their cars worth $15,500 and sold it for another car worth considerably less, racked up 
thousands of dollars in credit card bills, and forged Petitioner's name on documents 
allowing her to obtain additional credit. Nowhere in the appeal does Respondent inform 
the Court that when she returned from California that she entered the house, changed the 
locks and forced Respondent to find alternative housing. That subsequent to returning to 
the house, and as ordered by the trial court, that Respondent failed to make mortgage 
payments and created the risk that he home would be lost to foreclosure. This evidence 
would certainly support the trial court's finding that the Decree was based on equitable 
principles as set forth in paragraph 3 of the Amended Findings. 
Respondent fails to inform the Court that the parties had always used the imputed 
income figure of $1,118.00 per month for purposes of imputing ability to pay and that 
Respondent not once objected to this figure at trial when used for that purpose. Indeed, 
Petitioner raised this objection for the first time incident to her Motion to Amend 
Findings. See, Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition, attached as Exhibit L to 
Respondent's Addenda. 
It is not the appellee's obligation to marshal evidence that supports the trial 
court's findings.. Rather, this obligation falls to the appellant. In the present case, the 
Statement of Fact set forth by Respondent is bereft of evidence that would support the 
6 
trial court's findings of fact. This absence prevents Respondent from demonstrating that 
the trial court's findings of fact resisted the clear weight of evidence. This failure is fatal 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The burden of establishing the trial court's abuse of discretion falls to the 
appellant (Respondent herein). To carry this burden Utah Law requires an appellant to 
establish errors in both the fact-finding process and errors in the legal conclusions 
reached attendant to that process. To establish such error the appellant is required to 
marshal the evidence in favor of the finding of fact before arguing that such finding 
contradicts the clear weight of the evidence presented. The appellant must then show that 
the trial court made errors in its conclusions of law. 
Respondent does not carry this burden. Respondent entirely fails to marshal any 
evidence in support of the decision below and instead gives the Court the impression that 
the trial court's decision is arbitrary and aberrant. The decision is neither. Instead the 
trial court heard evidence that Respondent abandoned her husband, pilfered the bank 
accounts, sold their car, racked up thousands and thousands of dollars in marital credit 
card debt to support her lark, and forged her husband's name to obtain additional credit. 
Then, once she returned to Utah, she secreted herself into the marital residence, changed 
the locks, displaced her husband, and then failed to make mortgage payments on the 
home creating the possibility of foreclosure. The trial court's findings clearly reflect the 
weight of this evidence as per principles of equity. 
With respect to Respondent's specific findings, coupled with her failure to 
marshal evidence, Respondent's assertions border on bewildering. First, she asserts that 
the trial court made no findings with respect to a net amount for purposes of calculating 
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her monthly needs notwithstanding the fact that the parties had always used the stipulated 
figure for purposes of such calculations. 
Second, the court plainly stated in the Amended Findings that the $900.00 figure 
did not increase Petitioner's ability to pay alimony insofar as he would use that amount to 
pay the debt Respondent accumulated in connection with her lark. 
Third, the Findings plainly state that value of the Chrysler that Respondent 
unilaterally took and sold had the value of $15,500.00, not the Jeep that she acquired 
subsequent to disposing of the Chrysler. 
Fourth, the clear weight of the evidence established that the marital debt, the 
money siphoned from the accounts and the debt incurred by Respondent during her 
abandonment in the marital name significantly outweighed the equity in the home and 
Respondent has marshaled no evidence to attack this finding. 
Fifth, the court identified the nine thousand-dollar credit card debt in 
Respondent's name as a debt incurred solely by Respondent incident to the separation. 
Respondent has marshaled no evidence to attack this finding. 
Sixth, as set forth above, the court determined that significant debt remained 
subsequent to the application of the home's equity to that debt. 
Seventh, as set forth above the court based its awards on principles of equity and 
the court plainly stated that both parties had the ability to bear their own attorney's fees. 
Eighth, Respondent failed to marshal evidence in connection with her opposition 
to the Motion for Sanctions that would tend to establish that the trial court committed 
error when it awarded sanctions to Petitioner in connection with Respondent's ill-advised 
motion to compel. 
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Ninth, the court clearly stated that insufficient evidence was presented to allow 
the court to conclude that principles of equity would support the award. 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Paragraph 3 of the Amended Findings unequivocally states that the present 
Decree stems from a finding rooted in equity. But insofar as Respondent has failed to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions Respondent simply cannot 
establish as a matter of procedure that those conclusions offend the clear weight of the 
evidence presented. As this Court has repeatedly stated, "when an appellant fails to meet 
the heavy burden of marshaling the evidence, appellate courts are bound to assume the 
record supports the trial court's factual findings." Wade v. Stengl 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Respondent's argument impresses the notion that the trial court's conclusions 
abandon reason. But that argument ignores the clear weight of the evidence. At trial, the 
court heard evidence establishing that Respondent abandoned her husband, drained the 
bank accounts, unilaterally sold one the parties' cars, racked up thousands and thousands 
of dollars in marital credit card debt to support her frolic, and forged her husband's name 
to obtain additional credit. The court heard evidence establishing that when she returned, 
she secreted herself into the marital residence, changed the locks, then failed to make 
mortgage payments. The weight of this evidence prompted the court to issue the decree 
on equitable principles, and this finding of fact finds support in Utah law: "the court may 
consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(8)(b). 
And insofar as considerable discretion vests with trial court with respect to awards of 
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alimony and property, absent the marshaling of evidence, this Court simply should not 
conclude that the trial court's conclusions lack factual support. As a matter of procedure, 
Respondent's attacks on the trial court's findings of fact should be ignored and the trial 
court affirmed. 
II. WITH RESPECT TO THE AWARDS NO ABUSE LIES. 
"Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony and property 
distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated." Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
In the present case, Respondent does not establish an abuse of discretion and the trial 
court's awards should remain intact. 
A. Alimony. 
As set forth in paragraph 8 of the decree, the trial court considered the Jones 
factors as codified in Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(a) to determine the allocation of 
alimony. On those factors the trial court concluded that Respondent did not have the 
ability to support herself or the capacity to meet her reasonable needs and expenses. The 
court then concluded that Petitioner had the ability to contribute to Respondent's needs. 
In her brief, Respondent attacks the court's findings with respect to her ability to 
earn and Petitioner's ability to pay. The attack on the ability to earn is odd. As set forth 
above, the parties stipulated to the amount that would be imputed to Respondent for 
purposes of calculating her ability to meet expenses, and not once did Respondent 
suggest at trial that this figure would be anything other than a net figure for purposes of 
such calculations. As the record reflects, Respondent first raised this issue incident to 
filing her Motion to Amend Findings. The trial court heard this argument and rejected it. 
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The court used this figure to compute ability to meet expenses and the court clearly 
intended this figure to be a net amount. Absent a marshaling of the evidence supported 
by a showing of why the trial court's findings upset the clear weight of such evidence, 
this finding should not be disturbed. 
With respect to the issue of Petitioner's ability to pay, Respondent continues to 
minimize the damage she created in connection with her massive accrual of debt and how 
this debt continues to affect Petitioner's ability to pay. Moreover, much of Respondent's 
argument centers on preliminary findings issued prior to the court hearing the full body of 
evidence at trial. That evidence impacted the court's temporary order. As set forth 
above, subsequent to abandoning her husband, Respondent accumulated debt at an 
astonishing rate. She unilaterally sold marital assets for her private consumption while 
amassing debt that far outstripped the parties' assets. These debts continue to persist, and 
given Respondent's past actions and the fact that these outstanding debts would continue 
to impact both parties, the court entrusted Respondent with the responsibility of repaying 
these debts. As the court stated in paragraph 2 of the Amended Findings: "The Court 
finds that due to the uneven distribution of debt to Petitioner and the order requiring 
Petitioner to pay virtually all marital debt, the Court intentionally left the $900.00 in 
expenses to assist Petitioner in paying the marital debt." Exhibit N. This was trial 
court's finding, and Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence in support of this 
finding before attacking it. This Court should correctly presume that the record supports 
the trial court's finding with respect to this debt and Petitioner's ability to pay. The trial 
court's finding should be affirmed. 
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B. Distribution of marital property. 
"A trial court may elect to distribute marital property unequally when the 
circumstances and needs of the parties dictate a departure from the general rule." 
Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603 (Utah App. 1999). In the present case, the trial court 
elected to distribute the property in a manner commensurate with the distribution of debt, 
and Respondent has entirely mischaracterized the court's distribution without respect to 
either the actual language of the order or the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respondent entirely fails to characterize paragraph 4 of the Decree correctly. 
That paragraph states: "Further, Respondent shall be awarded the Chrysler automobile, 
which was traded in for the Jeep, with an approximate value of $15,500.00. Petitioner 
shall be awarded the truck, with an approximate value of $5,000.00 and the Marriott 
timeshare with an approximate value of $8,000.00." Thus, with respect to paragraph 4, 
Respondent has no grounds to attack the distribution. 
With respect to paragraph 5, the court determined that it would divide the 
property in a manner commensurate with an unequal distribution of debt. The court 
entrusted Petitioner with the responsibility of re-paying this debt—much of which 
Respondent incurred solely incident to her frolic—and to assist said repayment the court 
awarded Respondent the equity from the home. This is not an abuse of discretion on its 
face and Petitioner has utterly failed to marshal evidence in support of this finding before 
showing why the finding opposes the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial 
court's finding should be affirmed. 
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C. Attorney's fees. 
The decision to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
However, the award must be based on evidence of both financial need and 
reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Andersen v. 
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
A trial court has the discretion to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings pursuant 
to Utah Code § 30-3-3 (2001). Nowhere in this section does it say that a Trial Court 
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must award attorneys fees. In this case, the court rightfully exercised their discretion 
to elect not to award attorney's fees, the code states in pertinent part: 
Utah Code § 30-3-3(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may 
award costs and attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially 
prevailed upon the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or 
enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees. 
The court was correct in their finding that each party should pay their respective 
attorney fees. In [^3 of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the court 
stated that this case was decided on equitable principles as set forth above. The 
Respondent's actions contributed significantly to the dissipation of the marital assets. For 
this reason, the Trial Court saw no reason to award attorney fees and this court should not 
disturb this finding. 
III. PAST DUE ALIMONY. 
As clearly set forth below, the trial court concluded that no judgment would attach 
for past-due alimony owing to the confusion on both parties with respect to Petitioner's 
payment of Respondent's outstanding obligations made in lieu of alimony. And again, 
Respondent has marshaled no evidence in support of the trial court's finding before 
attacking such finding. As set forth above, this flaw prevents Petitioner from advancing 
the argument here. Moreover, as set forth in Exhibit L, Petitioner failed to present 
evidence at trial with respect to this position and raised this issue for the first time 
pursuant to the Motion to Amend Findings. Accordingly, this argument should be 
denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to deny 
Respondent's appeal. 
DATED this ) day of February, 2006. 
COOK, SKEEN & ROBINSON 
(NDALL L. SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellee 
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